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ESCHEAT? GESUNDHEIT. BUT FOR STATES, IT'S NOTHING
TO SNEEZE AT: Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993)
Cary B. Hall
While unclaimed property law' may seem obscure to many, and academic
to most, the operations surrounding abandoned property and its distribution
quite often affect those who might rather ignore it. Recent developments have
changed the law of escheat2 not only for those who have chosen to make it their
profession, but also for "ordinary" accountants, securities brokers, bankers, and
the lawyers who advise them. While financial institutions and other businesses
once enjoyed a windfall from abandoned or unclaimed funds fortuitously left
in their possession, all fifty states are now laying claim to any and all wealth not
collected by rightful owners.3 Though abandoned property constitutes only a
tiny fraction of all transacted property,4 this small amount accounts for
approximately $1.2 billion annually in escheatable receipts for states.' Not
* Articles and Comments Editor, BUSINESs LAw JOURNAL 1994, University of Miami School of
Law. The author would like to thank Frank A. Mazlewski, Jr., Administrator of the Bureau of Unclaimed
Property for the state of Delaware, for his invaluable knowledge and insight on the subject of escheat. The
author would also like to thank his new wife, Jennifer Girone Hall, for her unyielding support and
understanding throughout the research and writing process.
I This note deals specifically with intangible personal property which is left abandoned or
unclaimed. Tangible real property left behind when a person dies intestate and without heirs poses relatively
little regulatory problem and is easily regulated by the state exercising appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
However, property such as inactive bank accounts, abandoned stocks and bonds, unpaid insurance proceeds,
and others to be discussed infra, defies any notion of a distinct situs and cannot be so easily monitored. It is
this latter, intangible personal property that is referred to as "unclaimed property" within this article.
2 For purposes of this Note, any general reference to "escheat" includes traditional, or true,"
escheat, which vests actual title to any unclaimed property to claimant states, as well as custodial control of
such by states. A more detailed and explanatory discussion of this distinction will follow in Section I below.
3 In the recent case, Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct. 1550, 1555 (1993), forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia joined the two state parties as intervenors.
4 See Id., at 1554 n.6 (only 0.02% of all intermediary-distributed funds, like interest or corporate
dividends, is untraceable); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNCLAIMED MONEY: PROPOSALS FOR
TRANSFERRING UNCLAIMED FUNDS To STATES [hereinafter GAO REPORT] 33 (May 1989) (less than one-tenth
of 1% of all U.S. Postal Service money orders sold between 1983 and 1987 were still payable as of September
30, 1987). Furthermore, one reputable source calculates that perhaps half of all unclaimed property is valued
at less than $50. 1 DAviD J. EPSTEIN ET AL., UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Lw AND REPORTING FORMS § 1.06[3] [a]
(Bender 1990) [hereinafter EPSTEIN ET AL].
5 Figures estimating the value of abandoned property vary. A Wall Street Journal article dated
January 22, 1962, assessed outstanding unclaimed property at an aggregate $15 billion, growing at a rate of
$1 billion annually. Author, Title, WAL ST. J., January 22, 1962, at 1, col. 1. More recent sources appraise
the amounts obtained annually under state escheat laws at over $1 billion. See Report of the Special Master,
Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993), (111, Original), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, USplus
File, at LEXIS 10 n.9 (since New York escheated $360 million in unclaimed securities distributions between
1985 and 1989 alone, "the total escheatable funds for that period almost certainly far exceeds this amount");
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surprisingly, this current competition for what is arguably the largest available
source of non-taxable revenue has sparked heated controversies between states
that have implicated both Congress and the Supreme Court in an attempt to
formulate a suitable solution. Delaware v. New York6 marks the most recent
interstate crusade.
I. THE ESCHEAT TRADITION
The notion of sovereign escheat was born in feudal England around the
twelfth century.7 The concepts of real property under the feudalism of the
Middle Ages established vast hierarchies of ultimate ownership, with the
Crown at its apex. When a tenant in fee died without heirs and was therefore
unable to continue his occupancy, that real property "escheated," or reverted,
to the mesne lord who was the next immediate owner in the chain of
ownership.' Thus, the origins of escheat law are grounded in the early precepts
of real property title reversion and the medieval notions of ultimate ownership.
Unclaimed personalty was also collected, either by the mesne lords or the
Crown, based on the rule of bona vacantia.9 This doctrine, however,
functioned not on the premise that the Crown or lord was the ultimate owner
of right, but rather that both had a more valid claim to abandoned chattels than
any stranger.'0 Moreover, the collection of unclaimed personal property under
bona vacantia was initially custodial, as opposed to the immediate vesting of
Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. and David J. Epstein, Issues of Sovereignty in Escheat and the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1432 n.13 (1983) [hereinafter McThenia and Epstein] (letter
from Jim Lord, Minnesota State Treasurer (1982), estimating that states are holding $1.2 billion in unclaimed
property); Susan T. Kelly, Note, Unclaimed Billions: Federal Encroachment on States' Rights in Abandoned
Property, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1037, n.2 (1992) [hereinafter Kelly] (telephone interview of March 11, 1992 with
Patty White, Secretary of the National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators [hereinafter
NAUPA], declaring that states took custody of over $1.2 billion in unclaimed property in 1991); Gerald A.
Rosenberg and Mary B. Fisher, States Go To War Over Unclaimed Funds, 14 NAT. L.J. 17, col. 1
[hereinafter Rosenberg and Fisher] (according to NAUPA, for the year ending June 30, 1990, "more than $1.2
billion was collected by the states pursuant to their unclaimed-property statutes").
6 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993). See Section 1](D), infra.
7 See generally Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1319
(1961) [hereinafter Origins].
a Of course, some land was owned directly by the Crown, making the reversion uncomplicated.
More often, however, land ownership proceeded through a complex feudal chain of possession, with reversion
occurring through a series of higher loyalties. These reversion maneuvers played a decisive role in formulating
our present-day processes of real property succession.
9 See generally Origins, supra note 7. See also F. ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA (1927); Comment,
Bona Vacantia Resurrected, 34 ILL. L. REV. OF Nw. U. 171 (1939).
10 Under bona vacant/a, the Crown held the most superior right to secure abandoned property, should
a conflict with a lesser lord arise.
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title under the "true" escheat of real property." So while both real and personal
abandoned property of yore were claimed by either the lord or Crown as of
right, the theories underlying each type of succession substantially differed.' 2
Presently, all fifty states have enacted comprehensive laws regulating the
succession of unclaimed or abandoned intangible property 3 under the powers
1 Should no rightful owner appear, however, title to abandoned personal property was eventually
transferred to the holding lord or Crown. See Origins, supra note 7, at 1326-1327.
12 As the early States began enacting laws governing the succession of unclaimed property, the
principle of bona vacantia was absorbed by the traditional escheat power to create one action at law that could
reach both real and personal abandoned property. See McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1430 n.3;
Barbara C. Payne, Abandoned and Escheated Property: How Long Is Long Enough?, 64 CONN. BJ. 289, 290
(1990); Note, Escheat of Corporate Intangibles: Will the State of the Stockholder's Last Known Address Be
Able to Enforce Its Right?, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 560 (1966) [hereinafter NOTRE DAME LAW.]; Kelly,
supra note 5, at 1042; Jo Beth Prewitt, Comment, Unclaimed Property - A Potential Source of Non-Tax
Revenue, 45 Mo. L. REV. 493 (1980) [hereinafter Prewitt].
13 ALA. CODE §§ 35-12-1 To-50 (MICHIE 1991 & SuPP. 1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.45.101 to .780
(Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-301 to -340 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§
18-28-201 to -232 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §§ 1500 to 1599 (West 1982 & Supp.
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-13-101 to -134 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-56 to -76 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1130 to 1224 (Michie 1987 & Supp.
1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-201 to -242 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 717.001 to
.1401 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-190 to -235 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 523A-1 to -41 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 14-501 to -543 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1979 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, act 1025, §§ I to 30 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994);
IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-9-1-1 to -45 (Bums 1980 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 556.1 to .30 (West
Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3901 to -3933 (1983 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 393.010
to .990 (Baldwin 1989 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:151 to 188 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1801 to 1875 (West Supp. 1993); MD. COM. LAW. CODE ANN. §§ 17-101 to -326
(Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200A, §§ I to 17 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.733(1) to .734(4) (Callaghan 1986 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.31
to .60 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-12-1 to -57 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1993);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 447.500 to .595 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-9-101 to -316
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-1301 to -1332 (1990 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 120A.010 to .450
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 471-C:1 to 43 (Butterworth 1992 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
46:30B-1 to -109 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-8-1 to -40 (Michie 1993); N.Y. ABAND.
PROP. LAW §§ 101 to 1502 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-1 to -49 (Michie
1990); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 47-30.1-01 to -38 (Michie Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 169.01
to.99, §§ 1113.13 to.15, § 1157.20, §§ 1157.22 to .23, §§ 1165.20 to .22, §§ 2335.34 to .36 (Page 1990 &
Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 651 to 687 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 98.302 to .436
(Butterworth 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 1301.1 to .29 (West Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-21.1-
1 to -41 (Michie Supp. 1993); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 27-18-10 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-41B-1 to -38 (Michie Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-29-101 to -204 (Michie
1993); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 72.001 to 75.102 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-44-1
to -40 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 §§ 1208 to 1238 (Butterworth 1989 & Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-210.1 to -210.30 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
63.29.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-8-1 to -31 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 177.01 to .41 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); Wvo. STAT. §§ 34-24-101 to -139 (Michie Supp.
1993).
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reserved them by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. 4 Escheat statutes
generally require holders of unclaimed property to report to the state the amount
and type of such property held. In return, the statute provides for
indemnification of the holder when the property is relinquished.' Such statutes
typically prescribe a number of years of dormancy after which property is
presumed to have been abandoned; expiration of this allotted period triggers
state escheat.
Most state statutes embody a custodial form of escheat, 6 in which the state
assumes the holder's obligation to repay the missing owner rather than the
property title itself. 7 Those states adopting custodial escheat cite several
14 SeelI EPsINn ErAL., supra note 4, at § 2.02; McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1445-1447.
One source describes escheat rights as a state police power. Id., at 1431 n. 5.
Moreover, there is no express federal power to escheat under the U.S. Constitution. See Kelly,
supra note 5, at 1060-1079. But cf. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6408 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (unclaimed federal
income tax refunds may not be escheated by states); 38 U.S.C.A. § 8520 (West 1991) (federal government
may escheat the belongings of a deceased veteran who dies intestate and without heirs in a VA hospital);
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1961) (upholding 38 U.S.C.A. § 8520 by applying the
Necessary and Proper Clause to the constitutionally-delegated federal war powers); Arizona v. Bowsher, 935
F.2d 332, 334-335 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Alabama v. Bowsher, 112 S.Ct. 584 (1991) (unanimously
holding that a federal escheat statute preempted any similar state law under the Supremacy Clause where the
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congressional objectives); Note,
Escheat of Corporate Dividends, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1413 (1952) [hereinafter Corporate Dividends];
Origins, supra note 7, at 1336-1339 (1961).
Furthermore, Congress passed an amendment to the Federal Depository Insurance Act which
granted custody of unclaimed FDIC-insured deposits to states for ten years to facilitate the reunion of the
unclaimed deposits with their missing owners; if, however, any deposits are still unclaimed after the ten year
period, title to the funds reverts permanently to the FDIC. Pub. L No. 103-44, 107 Star. 220 (June 28, 1993),
codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1822(e) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994). For more on federalism and escheat, see GAO
REPORT, supra note 4; S. 1612, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
15 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 17.
16 Most states have more or less adopted the format of one of the three uniform statutes regulating
unclaimed property proffered by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming have adopted the more current 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, 8B U.LA. 567 (1993). The
1966 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 8A U.L.A. 207 (1993), remains in effect in Arkansas,
the District of Columbia, llinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Nebraska. Only West Virginia
still retains the superseded 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 8A U.L.A. 267 (1993).
For a detailed discussion of the 1981 Uniform Act, see I EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 4, at §§ 12.00 to
12.40; McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1453-60. See also Kelly, supra note 5, at 1058-1059. For
more on the 1954 and 1966 Uniform Act, see 1 EPSTEIN Er AL., supra note 4, at § 2.0515] [c]; McThenia and
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1440-1441; Kelly, supra note 5, at 1053-1055, 1057-1058; Prewitt, supra note 12,
at 497-502.
1 See Kelly, supra note 5, at 1044. Some, however, still cling to the "true" form of escheat and
transfer title to the state either immediately or after a brief period of custody. See id., at 1039 n. 15; see also,
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noteworthy justifications."8 The most compelling policy consideration is the
protection of the property rights of the missing owner.' 9 State custody of
unclaimed property prevents any adverse seizure and unjust enrichment by a
third party,' and also ensures that a perpetually solvent guarantor - the state
will exist to honor any future claim by the rightful owner.' State custody
also alleviates for a holder of unclaimed property a potentially infinite liability
on its company's accounting books.22 Finally, custodial escheat statutes
provide an additional, if only temporary, source of revenue for the state,23 and
allows for the redistribution of the unclaimed property back into the
commercial stream for the common good.'
H. STATE ESCHEAT AND THE SUPREME COURT
Unclaimed real property poses relatively little administrative problems for
states because the control is straightforward: if the land lies within a state's
borders, that res is subject to state regulation.25 Similarly, tangible chattels
abandoned within a state are just as easily accounted for. A difficulty arises,
however, in the governance of intangible unclaimed property that has no clear
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-9-1-36 (Bums 1980 & Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 471-C:30
(Butterworth 1992 & Supp. 1993).
is SeeDavid C. Auten, Note, Modem Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 96-111 (1963)
[hereinafter Auten]; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at § 1.07. The reasons for prescribing custodial escheat
rather than traditional escheat will become clearer in light of the Supreme Court decisions cited below in
Section H.
19 See Kelly, supra note 5, at 1047.
20 For example, unclaimed dividends remaining at a corporate dissolution are most often redistributed
to those stockholders who are known. See Auten, supra note 18, at 99-100. Likewise, a bank may assume
title of checking or savings accounts left dormant for an extended period of time. This may be also be
accomplished indirectly by imposing infinite service charges on inactive accounts.
While it is possible that an intermediary holder of unclaimed property may absorb it for purposes
of lowering rates, or increasing dividends or interest payments, it is far more likely that the assumed property
would be regarded as a fortunate windfall in order to boost profits. Id. at 101.
21 Id. at 98-99. This rationale loses force, however, when the security of the abandoned property
is not at risk. The most obvious examples are bank accounts insured by the Federal Depository Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) under 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811 to 1834 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
22 See Kelly, supra note 5, at 1047-48.
23 See id. at 1048-49. For statistics on the substantial monetary value of unclaimed property
escheated by states, see generally supra note 5.
24 See id., at 1042. These latter justifications echo those inherent in the earlier doctrine of bona
vacantia.
25 An early Supreme Court case embodying this accepted principle is Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1878).
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situs. 6 The confusion intensifies when the intangible property, e.g., stock
certificates, has no inherent worth itself, but is representative of some value
redeemable elsewhere. 27 Most importantly, perhaps, successful ascription of
situs to an intangible does not necessarily confer jurisdiction or enforcement
powers upon the situs state, but merely the "right" to escheat.2"
The Supreme Court has played an active role in defining the parameters of
state escheat of unclaimed property during the past eighty years.29 Two
discernible periods exist regarding cases involving state escheat controversies.30
Cases decided prior to World War II center on the state's power to escheat and
obtain custody of unclaimed intangible property, and conflicts were largely
between one state and the intermediary left holding the abandoned property.
Post-World War II cases deal with interstate controversies, and focus on the
development of a practical scheme for the distribution of unclaimed property.3
A. Escheat Litigation Prior to World War II
In 1911, the escheat controversy began when a Massachusetts unclaimed
property statute was challenged in Provident Institution for Savings v.
Malone.32 The statute, which provided for custodial escheat of inactive savings
accounts, was contested by the holder as exceeding the state's authority over
26 Justice, then Judge, Cardozo once summarized this predicament:
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times when justice or convenience
requires that a legal situs be ascribed to them. The locality selected is for some purposes, the
domicile of the creditor; for others, the domicile or place of business of the debtor, the place, that
is to say, where the obligation was created or was meant to be discharged; for others, any place
where the debtor can be found .... At the root of the selection is generally a common sense
appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions.
Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931), cited in McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1434 n.27, and NOTRE
DAME L. R., supra note 12, at 575. See also McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1434-35.
27 SeeJoseph P. Giljum, Comment, A Survey of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes,
9 ST. LOuis U. L.J. 85 (1964).
28 NOTRE DAME L. R., supra note 12, at 576.
29 See Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); First National Bank of San
Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S.
541 (1948); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643
(1961); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S.
674 (1965); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972); Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct 1550 (1993).
30 See McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1436-38.
31 Id.; see also I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at § 2.03.
32 221 U.S. 660 (1911).
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private banking affairs. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as
a proper exercise of state sovereignty a opening the door for similar legislation
in other states and subsequent escheat litigation. The Court further reasoned
that the custodial nature of the statute was beneficial since it left open
indefinitely the possibility of reunion between the rightful owner and the
unclaimed deposits.'
First National Bank of San Jose v. California35 applied the principles of
federalism to an early California escheat statute which transferred titles of
dormant bank accounts to the state.a6 At issue was whether or not the state
statute could also be applied to unclaimed funds held by a national bank. The
Court held that such state escheat would unduly interfere with the implied
powers under the Constitution37 to institute a federal banl As such, First
National Bank constituted the first blow to the newly established state power
to acquire unclaimed property under escheat legislation.
That same year, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to review the
California escheat statute in Security Savings Bank v. California.39 This time,
the challenge was brought by a state bank which questioned the due process of
"true" escheat statutes, citing First National Bank. The statute, however, was
upheld as a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty when applied to unclaimed
deposits in state banks.' Moreover, the Court explained that if a state escheat
statute satisfies minimum due process requirements - in this case, publication,
a liberal intervention policy, and a five-year reclamation period - it did not
matter whether the statute transferred custody or actual title of the abandoned
property to the escheating state."
Twenty years later, Anderson National Bank v. Lucket 2 reevaluated state
action to escheat unclaimed funds held under federal jurisdiction.43 Kentucky
sought to apply its custodial escheat statute to abandoned accounts left in a
33 Id. at 664.
Id. at 664-65.
35 262 U.S. 366 (1923).
36 The California statute was of the "true" escheat type, immediately vesting title of the unclaimed
accounts to the state.
37 For more on the legitimacy of national banks, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 401-25 (1819).
39 262 U.S. 366, 368-70.
39 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
40 Id. at 285-86.
41 Id. at 286-90.
42 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
43 See McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1436; Kelly, supra note 5. at 1063-64.
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national bank. The Court distinguished First National Bank, noting that the
earlier California statute was a "true" escheat law, while the Kentucky statute
at bar was custodial.' The opinion asserted that mere custody of the funds did
not interfere with the bank's federal charter, so Kentucky would be allowed to
assume custody of the unclaimed accounts held by the national bank.45 The
Luckett Court, however, cushioned its opinion by reaffirming its prior judgment
in Security Savings Bank that as long as the requisite due process procedures
are followed, the distinction between traditional escheat and custodial statutes
is technical at best.
47
B. The Race of Diligence
A new era of escheat litigation began in 1948 with Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Moore.48 Until then, the Supreme Court had primarily
concerned itself with the legitimacy of state escheat of unclaimed property
within its own borders. In Connecticut Mutual, New York sought to obtain
custody of unclaimed proceeds of insurance policies issued on its citizens by
corporations incorporated in states other than New York.49 Nine insurance
companies brought suit to declare such application of the statute invalid on
grounds that it violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution,"0 and that it
exceeded the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 ' Ina
6-3 decision, the Court rejected the petitioners' Contracts Clause argument and
reasoned that a state acting under a custodial escheat statute functions merely
as a "conservator," rather than a party under contract. 2 As for the due process
claim, Justice Reed determined that New York had "sufficient contacts" with
the out-of-state insurance companies to assert custody over the uncollected
policies issued on its residents. 3 The majority opinion stressed that the sole
44 321 U.S. 233, 249-52 (while states have the sovereign right to escheat unclaimed property, such
statutes may not be so zealous that they would discourage potential depositors). Surprisingly, the Court did
not seemed concerned that the Kentucky statute also provided for ultimate escheat after the requisite custody
period lapsed.
45 Id. at 252.
46 Supra note 40.
47 321 U.S. 233, 245-46.
49 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
49 Id. at 542-44.
so U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
51 333 U.S. 541, 545.
52 Id. at 545-48.
53 Id. at 548-51.
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issue was the constitutionality of state custody of unclaimed funds belonging
to its own citizens, and limited its holding to that effect.' Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson wrote dissenting opinions, chiding the majority for issuing a
declaratory judgment on the New York statute.55 Justice Jackson particularly
attacked the competency of the "sufficient contacts" test as applied to a
hypothetical controversy, and recognized that under this same analysis several
other states might also qualify to escheat the present insurance proceeds.56
Justice Frankfurter underscored the Court's function as a tribunal for state
conflicts through original jurisdiction, 7 and counseled that the Court ought not
"peck at the problem" until original jurisdiction is invoked."
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey", the Supreme Court considered a state
statute which escheated unclaimed dividends and stocks of corporations formed
in that state. Standard Oil contested New Jersey's escheat of corporate
unclaimed property on jurisdictional and due process grounds, arguing that an
adverse decision could subject the company to multiple liabilities from various
state escheat claims. Again, Justice Reed penned a 5-4 majority opinion,
upholding the New Jersey statute under the Connecticut Mutual "sufficient
contacts" test6 The Court opined that New Jersey obtained valid jurisdiction
over the unclaimed stocks and dividends since the debtor corporation was
amenable to process through its registered office within the state, and that the
intangible nature of the abandoned property could not impede state escheat.6
54 Justice Reed wrote that the Court did not pass on the statute's application "in instances where
insured persons, after delivery, cease to be residents of New York or where the beneficiary is not a resident
of New York at maturity of the policy." Id. at 549.
I d. at 551-56 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 556-57 (Jackson. J., dissenting).
6 ld. at 557-64 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson predicted the subsequent escheat litigation
which would stem from the majority's opinion:
It seems to me that the constitutional doctrine we are applying here, if we are consistent in its
application, leaves us in this dilemma: In sustaining the broad claims of New York, we either cut
off similar and perhaps better rights of escheat by other states or we render insurance companies
liable to two or more payments of their single liability.
Id. at 560 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
57 U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 2.
59 333 U.S. 541, 555-56 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
60 Id. at 442.
fi Justice Reed cited to a Harvard Law Review article expounding on the nature of debtor-creditor
relationships. Joseph H. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARv.
L. REV. 107 (1913). Professor Beale explained that since a debt is a forced relation between parties and has
no real situs anywhere, the law obtains control by making use of the underlying relationship that created the
debt. In other words, the law controls the debt by simply controlling the debtor-creditor parties themselves.
Id. at 115-116. See supra note 25.
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Regarding the corporation's concern about possible escheat by more than one
state, the majority pointed to the Full Faith and Credit Clause62 as preventing
multiple states from claiming such unclaimed property held by intermediaries
such as Standard Oil.63
Two dissents were filed.' Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson,
objected to escheat by the state of incorporation as opposed to the escheat by
the state of the owner's last known address upheld in Connecticut Mutual.65
The sovereign right to escheat unclaimed property, he argued, is not created
simply because a state may subject a corporation to process within its courts.66
Justice Frankfurter further noted that New Jersey's statute assumed title rather
than custody, and subsequently extinguished any future claim by the state of an
owner's last address as upheld in Connecticut Mutual.67
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, also criticized the statute's effect
on the claims of other states. He again catalogued potential state claimants
based on the "sufficient contacts" test, observing that only one of these states
was present in this litigation.6 ' Furthermore, while a custodial statute would
enable other states to come forward with a greater claim, New Jersey's "true"
escheat statute hastily appropriated the unclaimed property for that state's
exclusive use."
Reading Connecticut Mutual and Standard Oil together, many states aptly
ascertained that in order to assume unclaimed property within their
jurisdictions, they must necessarily be the first to claim it.7° This epiphany
inspired a myriad of state legislatures to amend their escheat statutes, reducing
the number of years necessary to presume intangible property abandoned.7'
The "race of diligence" to escheat unclaimed property, as foreseen by Justice
Frankfurter,72 persisted for a decade until the Supreme Court once again had
62 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
63 341 U.S. 428, 442-43.
Id. at 443-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 443-44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 444 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 444-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution ought not to be placed in an
unseemingly light by suggesting that the constitutional rights of the several States depend on, and are
terminated by, a race of diligence.").
Id. at 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
70 See Prefatory Note, 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, supra note 16, at 570; McThenia and
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1439-1440; Kelly, supra note 5, at 1053.
71 See Kelly, supra note 5, at 1053. Such amendments also reflected the eagerness of states to gain
control over fallow intangible property sooner.
72 Supra note 68.
ESCHEAT? GESUNDHEIT
occasion to address a state escheat statute in Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Pennsylvania."
In a situation similar to Connecticut Mutual, Pennsylvania applied its
escheat statute to undispersed money orders bought in Pennsylvania from
Western Union, a New York corporation. Western Union sued, not to claim the
unclaimed property for itself, but for relief from multiple escheat liability in
other states.74 In an unanimous opinion, Justice Black reversed the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania and its decision upholding the statute's application.75
The Court ruled that the Pennsylvania state court judgment need not be
afforded full faith and credit by parties not subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction,
and was therefore unable to protect Western Union from multiple escheats.76
Instead Justice Black, recalling past dissents, invited Pennsylvania to file suit
under the Court's original jurisdiction."
C. Texas v. New Jersey and its Progeny
In 1965, the state of Texas accepted the Court's invitation and filed an
original action against New Jersey and Pennsylvania over unclaimed property
held by the Sun Oil Company.7 Texas claimed escheat rights on two counts,
relying on the "sufficient contacts" test utilized in Connecticut Mutual and
Standard Oil: either the property was owed out of Sun's Texas offices, or it was
owed to persons having a last known address in Texas, or both. New Jersey
sought control over the funds as Sun's state of incorporation. Since Sun's
principle business offices were located in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania asserted
its contacts were sufficient to grant it the power to escheat. Finally, because
some of the unclaimed property was last owned by Florida residents, Florida
73 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
74 This fear of multiple liability was not merely hypothetical, for New York had already seized under
its own escheat laws a part of the very funds now sought by Pennsylvania. Id. at 74.
75 Id. at 80.
76 Id. at 75.
" Id. at 79-80. See also I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at § 2.03[3] ("In effect, Western Union
forced any state facing an actual dispute with a sister state to bring an original action in the Supreme Court
for a declaration of its rights before is could take the property.").
Justice Stewart briefly concurred in the reversal because he felt that only New York, as the state
of incorporation, could escheat the disputed unclaimed property. 368 U.S. 71, 80 (Stewart, J., concurring).
79 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965). The property consisted of unclaimed debts to
approximately 1,730 creditors, totalling approximately $26,500.00. Id. at 675.
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was permitted to intervene79 and argued that the last known address of the
creditor alone should be dispositive of a state's power to escheat.
The Court-appointed Special Master ° recommended Florida's position,
that unclaimed property should escheat only to the state where the owner last
resided, and the Supreme Court approved. 8' In an 8-1 opinion, Justice Black
conceded that, though it may have served its purpose where a single state was
involved, the "sufficient contacts" test proved unworkable when two or more
states sought to escheat the same property.82 Furthermore, the contacts test
relied on by Texas bred uncertainty as to which state had a higher claim to
escheat, and fostered a case-by-case approach whenever an interstate
disagreement arose.83 The same problems were inherent in locating a
company's principal place of business to determine an escheat right as insisted
by Pennsylvania." Moreover, it seemed strange to convert a corporate debt into
an asset by granting the right to escheat to the state in which a corporation
happened to settle.85
The remaining choices - the state of incorporation as proposed by New
Jersey, and the state of the owner's last known address offered by Florida -
both presented an uncomplicated, bright-line test for determining state escheat.
The Court noted, however, in order to award escheat to the state of
incorporation would be to "exalt a minor factor" that may result from mere
coincidence.' Florida's position, upholding escheat rights for the owner's state
373 U.S. 948. Though it claimed no right to escheat this property, Illinois unsuccessfully attemp-
ted to intervene to argue for the escheat rights of the state in which the indebtedness originated. 372 U.S. 973.
See 379 U.S. 674, 677 n.6.
so 372 U.S. 926. In light of the Court's limited ability to conduct hearings or take extensive
testimony normally shouldered by a trial court in the early stages of litigation, it usually appoints a fact-finding
Special Master in cases brought under original jurisdiction. The Special Master drafts and submits a report
containing any conclusions or recommendations as necessary. The Court is not bound -by the findings of the
Special Master, but may choose in its discretion to adopt parts or all of the report in its opinion. Rosenberg
and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20; Lawrence A. Kobrin and Dean Ringel, Conflict Over Escheat Funds, N.Y.
L.J., March 30, 1992, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Kobrin and Ringel].
M This is known as the "primary rule" espoused by Texas v. New Jersey.
92 379 U.S. 674, 678-79.
83 Id.
4 Id. at 680. This analysis also applied to Illinois' proposition that the state wherein the debt
transpired be allowed to escheat. Id. For an earlier discussion, see Corporate Dividends, supra note 14, at
1417-18.
95 379 U.S. 674, 680.
'4 Id. at 679-80. But cf Corporate Dividends, supra note 14, at 1418; Note, Texas v. New Jersey,
379 U.S. 674 (1965) - Escheat of Intangibles, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 555-58 (1965).
Justice Stewart dissented on precedential grounds, adhering to the earlier decisions in Security
Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923), Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944),
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of last known residence, proved most equitableY By discerning that the
unclaimed corporate debts symbolized the assets of the missing owners,
Florida's plan redistributed escheatable property in proportion to the business
activities of a state's citizens.8 The opinion defined the owner's residence as
the last known address as listed on the records of the debtor to avoid technical
legal concepts of domicile and to promote the ideals of clarity and ease of
administration. 9
In the event that the owner's state of last known address was unable to
escheat,90 the Court held that the state of incorporation would be permitted to
assume custody and/or title of any remaining unclaimed property. 9' This
secondary rule9 of Texas v. New Jersey, however, was subject to any superior
right to escheat, i.e., the state of the owner's last known address, which might
later be brought.93 Justice Black concluded the Court's opinion with this
exegesis:
and Standard Oil v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), which held that the state of incorporation may rightly
escheat. 379 U.S. 674, 683 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
87 Cf. Corporate Dividends, supra note 14, at 1413-16.
U 379 U.S. 674, 680-81. This was also consistent with the common law tradition of mobilia
sequunturpersonam, i.e., that personal property is found at the domicile of its owner. Id. at 680 n.10; see
also McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1443 n.80.
99 379 U.S. 674, 680-681.
90 This could occur when either the owner's address is not available, or when the laws of the state
of last known address do not provide for escheat of the abandoned property. Id. at 682.
91 Id.
92 Indeed, one may question this "secondary" rubric since recent sources indicate that half of all
unclaimed property reported does not contain a last known address. I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at §
2.05[4][a][i]; McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1453 n.135, 1456.
93 Id. David J. Epstein and Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., co-reporters of the 1981 Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, supra note 16, paraphrase the holding of Texas v. New Jersey as follows:
When two or more states, exercising valid claims of power to take custody of abandoned property
assert conflicting claims to the same property, priority shall be given to the state of the creditor.
1 EPSTEIN Er AL., supra note 4, at § 2.04[2]; McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1444.
By characterizing the holding as such, Epstein and McThenia have argued that Texas v. New
Jersey does not deny any state the sovereign,right to escheat unclaimed property within its jurisdiction. I
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at § 2.05[4][b]; McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1444-48. Instead,
Texas v. New Jersey would apply only when disagreeing states take their respective cases to the Supreme
Court under original jurisdiction. In other words, so long as a state is not brought before the Supreme Court
by another state, it may escheat unclaimed property within its grasp under its sovereign power to do so,
without regard to the hierarchy created in Texas v. New Jersey. Id.
Though this view may seem unnecessarily officious to some, Epstein and McThenia's position
would, however, reconcile Texas v. New Jersey with past escheat precedents such as Connecticut Mutual and
Standard Oil, supra notes 48 and 59, respectively. See supra note 86; see also Sperry & Hutchinson v.
O'Connor, 488 Pa. 340, 412 A.2d 539 (1980), and State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co.,
510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974), discussed in McThenia and Epstein, supra note 5, at 1448-50.
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We realize that this case could have been resolved otherwise, for the
issue here is not controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions or
by past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic. It is fundamentally a
question of ease of administration and of equity. We believe that the
rule we adopt is the fairest, is easy to apply, and in the long run will be
the most generally acceptable to all the States. 94
The rules of Texas v. New Jersey constituted an initial panacea95 for
interstate escheat competition until Pennsylvania sought to resurrect its
previous Western Union' litigation by bringing a declaratory suit against New
York, Florida, Oregon and Virginia in Pennsylvania v. New York.
97
Pennsylvania v. New York addressed the retroactive application of Texas v.
New Jersey to abandoned money orders sold by Western Union prior to 1963,
and additionally functioned as a general challenge to the primary and secondary
escheat rules previously enumerated by the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Jersey.
Pennsylvania observed that some companies, like Western Union, do not
establish any persons as "creditors," nor is it standard practice to record the
addresses of purchasers. Since the missing owner's last known address is
unknown - indeed, it was never retained in the first place - the secondary
rule of Texas v. New Jersey would dictate that the power to escheat any
unclaimed money orders be conferred on the state of incorporation, in this case
New York. Pennsylvania argued that where no address is retained on
unclaimed money orders, the state of purchase of the money order ought to be
presumed the state of the sender's last known address for escheat purposes.9"
379 U.S. 674, 683.
95 This Note does not attempt to discuss the logistical difficulties that may be associated with Texas
v. New Jersey. However, much has been written on the enforcement problems inherent in the Court's
holding, and these materials focus generally on states' limited power and jurisdiction to compel and enforce
companies' reporting of unclaimed property, varying business practices of holders of unclaimed property, and
collection costs associated with state escheat. See generally I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at § 2.05[4][a][v]
and § 2.05 generally; Prewitt, supra note 12, at 502-09; Robert E. Berkley, Jr., supra note 12, at 565-77.
Many commentators point out that there is no initial requirement for businesses to acquire addresses of its
creditors, and many corporations never retain addresses. Id.; see also supra note 93. Statutes of limitations
may also potentially prove problematic. I EPSTEIN Er AL., supra note 4, at §§ 3.01 to 4.08; cf Developments
in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
% Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
97 407 U.S. 206 (1972). Western Union was also enumerated as a defendant to the suit. The
Supreme Court allowed Connecticut, California and Indiana to intervene as party plaintiffs. 400 U.S. 811,
924, 1019 (1970). Arizona was permitted to intervene as a defendant. Id. at 1019.
99 407 U.S. 206, 212. Connecticut, California and Indiana also advanced this proposition.
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New York, on the other hand, argued for a strict application of the Texas v.
New Jersey rules, but against its retroactivity."
The Special Master recommended that the rules devised in Texas v. New
Jersey should be followed as written, based on their suitability as easily-
administered guidelines and clear precedent, and also be retroactive in
implementation. 10 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed.'0 ' Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that granting escheat rights to a state
of purchase may permit states with no continuing relationship to either sender
or payee to abridge the property rights of the parties at bar."re More
importantly, however, adoption of a new escheat scheme would undermine the
ease of administration promoted in Texas v. New Jersey: to uphold
Pennsylvania's objections would succumb to the very case-by-case approach
that had generated the bulk of escheat litigation and interstate dispute.
0 3
Justice Powell dissented, charging that the majority had sacrificed justice
for administrative comfort. Because Texas v. New Jersey was brought under
original jurisdiction, it need not be followed as precedent and may abdicate
when justice directs otherwise."04 If anything, the principles upon which Texas
v. New Jersey was founded, rather than the outcome itself, ought to be
considered most persuasive. The Court had previously rejected the state of
incorporation because it placed too much focus on minor details, and also
because it disregarded the intent to distribute unclaimed property in proportion
to the amount of business transacted by a state's citizens. 5 Justice Powell
concluded that by applying the spirit, rather than the letter, of Texas v. New
Jersey to the case at bar, it would be most equitable to assume that the state in
which a money order is purchased is also the state of the creditor's residence
for escheat purposes."
At the insistence of companies transacting money orders and traveler's
checks, Congress passed legislation in 1974 which constructively annulled the
99 Id. By arguing against retroactivity, New York could then retain control of all pre-Texas v. New
Jersey unclaimed money orders, regardless of the creditor's address, as the state of incorporation under Standard
Oil v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
10o 1 EPSTEIN ElAL., supra note 4, at § 2.04[3].
1o 407 U.S. 206, 215.
102 Id. at 213.
103 Id. at 215.
104 Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also characterized the majority opinion as a
"Cinderella-like compulsion to accommodate this ill-fitting precedential 'slipper."' Id. at 222 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
105 Id. at 217-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"06 Id. at 219-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. New York."W The federal statute,
declaring that a "substantial majority" of purchasers of money orders and
traveler's checks live in the state in which such instruments are bought,08
decreed that if the books and records of the debtor business contains the state
of purchase of an abandoned money order or traveler's check, then that state
may escheat." 9 If, however, no address exists or the state of purchase does not
have applicable escheat legislation, the escheat rights are relinquished to the
state containing the debtor corporation's principle place of business,
conditional upon any future superior right.'10
D. Delaware v. New York
Two decades passed before the Supreme Court heard another case
involving state escheat. In the recent case of Delaware v. New York,"
Delaware brought an original action against New York, alleging that New York
had illegally escheated unclaimed property rightfully owed to Delaware as the
state of incorporation under the secondary rule of Texas v. New Jersey."' The
property at issue consisted primarily of unclaimed dividends, interest and other
corporate debts held by financial intermediaries in "street name" accounts."'
The proceeds of these "street name" accounts were usually considered
unclaimed when the financial intermediary could not locate the true, beneficial
owner himself. This may occur through bookkeeping errors by either the
107 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1525 (October 28, 1974), codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2501 to 2503
(West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
10 12 U.S.C.A. § 2501(2).
109 12 U.S.C.A. § 2503(1).
110 12 U.S.C.A § 2503(2), (3).
II 113 S.Ct. 1550, 123 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).
112 By the date of oral argument, however, every other state and the District of Columbia had sought
and was granted leave to intervene, making Delaware v. New York the first Supreme Court case which
involved every state of the union. See 113 S.Ct. 1550, 1555.
113 The Court, through Justice Thomas, explained that as record owners, intermediaries (such as
banks, brokers and depositories) often collect corporate distributions in their own name for later disbursement
to the beneficial securities owners. These "street name" accounts allow a financial broker to offer various
services to shareholders, such as brokerage margin accounts, dividend reinvestment programs, and the like.
Moreover, these accounts provide invaluable efficiency for quick transfer of beneficial ownership through
computerized book entries rather than the physical transfer of stock certificates. 113 S.Ct. 1550, 1554. See
also SECURMES AND EXCH. COMM'N, Division of Market Regulation, PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS:
DEPOSITORY IMMOBILIZATION OF SECURITIES AND USE OF BOOK-ENTRY SYSTEMS 4 (1985); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1421-22 (6th ed. 1990); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the
Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CoRp. L 683, 688-
91 (1988); Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20.
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corporate issuer, the financial intermediary, or even the beneficial owner. A
recent article explained how this may happen:
From time to time, however, [intermediary] institutions receive a
greater amount of a particular distribution from the issuer than their
own records show is owed to their customers.
In most instances, these excess distributions are attributable to a
change in beneficial ownership of the securities underlying the
distribution before the record date without a contemporaneous transfer
of record ownership. Thus, on the pay date, the issuers make the
distributions to the institutions that are owners of record on the books
of the issuer but which, in fact, had sold or transferred the securities
prior to the record date.
The institutions receiving excess distributions attempt to check for
internal bookkeeping errors. But unless a claim for payment of the
excess distribution is made, the institution may not know to whom the
money is owed and may simply retain it."14
Between 1985 and 1989, New York had escheated $360 million"5 in
unclaimed corporate distributions held by New York intermediaries" 6
regardless of the beneficial owner's last known address or the intermediaries'
state of incorporation under the rules of Texas v. New Jersey."7 The escheat
laws of most states, including Delaware, maintain a presumption of
abandonment of unclaimed property after five to seven years." 8 Under the New
York Abandoned Property Laws, however, unclaimed property was generally
presumed to be abandoned after only three years." 9 Consequently, New York
had already exercised and concluded its escheat campaign in an attempt to
114 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20.
'" Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) estimated that between 1985 and 1991, New York had
seized "more than $630 million of unclaimed dividend and interest payments." 139 CONG. RECORD H3776
(daily ed. June 17, 1993). Another report indicated that New York was holding approximately $800 million
in unclaimed funds subject to superior escheat claims by other states. Kobrin and Ringel, supra note 80, at
4.
116 It is worth noting that most of the securities intermediaries, acting either as depositories or holding
"street name" accounts, have located their principal places of business in New York, primarily due to the
amount of securities trading that takes place within the state.
17 113 S.Ct. 1550, 1554-55.
1"8 See supra note 13.
119 N.Y. ABAND. PRop. LAW § 511 (McKinney 1991).
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circumvent Texas v. New Jersey long before most other states' unclaimed
property procedures even became applicable. "o
Several arguments were heard by the Court-appointed Special Master.'
As plaintiff, Delaware argued for a strict application of the secondary rule of
Texas v. New Jersey, i.e., that when a creditor's last known address is
unavailable, the state of the debtor's incorporation may escheat any abandoned
or unclaimed property. Delaware theorized that the financial intermediaries
holding the "street name" accounts were the relevant "debtors" in the present
transactions because corporate issuers had already discharged their distribution
responsibilities when payment was disbursed to the intermediaries as record
owners. This position was furthered by the reality that the financial
intermediaries are ultimately accountable to the true "creditors," the beneficial
owners, under a contractual obligation.'
Conversely, New York had a different interpretation of the debtor-creditor
relationship. New York referred to the typically complex chain of ownership
and distribution in securities transactions, and argued that any communication
breakdown resulting in unclaimed funds hardly ever trickled down to the
ultimate beneficial owner. Rather, most abandoned claims or incomplete
information occurred between multiple financial intermediaries - thus,
limiting the debtor-creditor relationship almost exclusively to transactions
between the intermediaries themselves. When the distributions were declared
abandoned, the usual "creditors" were in fact the intermediaries within the
chain of corporate disbursement, rather than the ultimate beneficial owner.
Since most of these "creditor" intermediaries had ascertainable trading
addresses in New York, the Empire State contended that those addresses
represented the creditor's last known address under the first prong of Texas v.
New Jersey. Moreover, New York argued that since the "creditors" in this
conflict are predominantly other financial intermediaries, a statistical sampling
of these brokerage relationships - rather than an expensive, time-consuming
examination of each recorded transaction - should suffice a conclusion that
virtually all of the "creditor" intermediaries have New York addresses.
120 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 17. Perhaps even more distressing was while New York's
escheat legislation was custodial on its face, the underlying reality was that New York generally transferred
its escheats directly into its general treasury. The New York legislature had established only a paltry fund of
$750,000 in which to pay out escheated funds eventually claimed by reappearing owners, when in fact the
annual value of unclaimed property escheated by the state was many times higher. Kobrin and Ringel, supra
note 80, at 4.
121 The Supreme Court appointed Thomas H. Jackson, Dean of the University of Virginia School of
Law, as Special Master. 488 U.S. 990 (1988).
122 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20. See also U.C.C. § 8-207(l), 2C U.L.A. 339 (1991).
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Consequently, New York possessed the most superior right to escheat the
unclaimed corporate distributions held by the "creditor" intermediaries.123
Other states also proffered their own proposals which would entitle them
to a portion of the funds escheated by New York. Texas, along with forty-one
other states, insisted that the principles of fairness and clarity embodied in
Texas v. New Jersey and Pennsylvania v. New York mandated the recognition
of the most obvious "debtor" - the issuing corporation - for purposes of
determining the state of rightful escheat."2 These states pointed out that
securities depositories and brokerage houses had developed for the efficiency
and convenience of beneficial shareholders only. The Special Master
summarized this legal theory:
[T]he intermediaries are simply way-stations in a system that
distributes funds from the debtor (the issuer) to the creditor (the
beneficial owner), and the happenstance of where along this route a
holder realizes that the intended payee cannot be located should not be
determinative for purposes of escheat law's application.'
t 5
Another small group of states, headed by California, proposed a new
secondary rule for the case at bar, and suggested that the unclaimed funds be
distributed over time to all states in proportion to the commercial activities of
their respective citizens.'26 It was argued that the entire phenomenon of
securities trading was national in scope, and that the Court need not nor ought
not undertake the difficult job of assigning a situs to the intangible funds at all.
Moreover, the proposition of California et al., followed the original analysis
advanced in Texas v. New Jersey'" that such redistribution provided the most
equitable escheat system.
28
123 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20.
124 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20. Though the majority of the unclaimed funds would
still escheat to Delaware by applying the secondary rule of Texas v. New Jersey under this proposal, some of
the abandoned property would still escheat to other states of incorporation. Moreover, government bonds
issued by states and municipalities would become escheatable by the sovereign which solicited them. Id. See
Report of the Special Master, Delaware v. New York, 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993) (111, Original), available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, USplus File, at LEXIS 24 [hereinafter Report of Special Master].
125 Report of Special Master, supra note 124, at LEXIS 11.
126 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20.
127 Supra note 88.
128 Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5, at 20.
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After hearing all of the arguments, the Court-appointed Special Master
issued his report containing the following recommendations. 29 Rejecting New
York's argument, the Special Master found that the unclaimed distributions did
not have any last known addresses under the primary rule of Texas v. New
Jersey; consequently, the secondary rule allowing the debtor's state of
incorporation the right to escheat was applicable. 30 As to which institution was
the most appropriate "debtor" - the intermediary or the corporate issuer - the
Special Master concurred with the proposal offered by .Texas et al., and
considered the original issuer to be the fairest interpretation, in part because it
would tend to distribute the abandoned funds more uniformly among the
states.' 3' In coming to his conclusion, the Special Master conducted an
exhaustive analysis of state concepts of debtor-creditor law, ultimately deciding
that the right to escheat ought not be determined by either legal semantics or
differing state ideologies.'32
Instead, the Special Master proposed sua sponte that the secondary rule of
Texas v. New Jersey be updated by allowing the state of the issuer's principle
place of business, rather than the debtor's state of incorporation, to escheat
unclaimed securities distributions when the beneficial owner's last known
address is unavailable. 33  He observed that while a great percentage of
companies are incorporated in only a few states, corporate headquarters are
more evenly situated among the states.' 34 This variation would more fairly
reward states whose escheat would benefit the "company whose business
activities made the intangible property come into existence. 1 35 Accompanying
this departure from Texas v. New Jersey was the further recommendation that
his new secondary rule be applied retroactively to the unclaimed funds recently
escheated by New York. 36 The Special Master considered these modifications
129 Report of Special Master, supra note 124. The Report was filed on January 28, 1992.
130 California's proposal for the proportional escheat of unclaimed funds to states was rejected by the
Special Master.
131 Report of Special Master, supra note 124, at LEXIS 24. In reaching his conclusion, it seems that
the Special Master found a greater amount of financial intermediaries incorporated in only a few states than
were the aggregate of all corporations issuing publicly-traded stock. See supra note 124.
132 Report of Special Master, supra note 124, at LEXIS 26.
1 Id. at LEXIS 28-33. The "principle place of business" of a corporate issuer is determined by the
address of the corporation's headquarters as indicated on the cover sheet of the periodic filings required by and
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
134 Id. at LEXIS 31.
135 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 680 (1965).
136 This corollary would have each state claiming a portion of the $360 million in unclaimed
distributions held by New York if that state could prove it contained within its borders any corporate
headquarters, and thus a more superior escheat right under the Special Master's proposed rule. Moreover,
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to be "minor," appearing "congruent, in both letter and spirit, with the Court's
original goals in fashioning equitable rules in this area in Texas v. New
Jersey.'
37
Both Delaware and New York objected to the debtor-creditor analysis of
the Special Master. Delaware filed an exception to the Special Master's
departure from the original secondary rule of Texas v. New Jersey. Delaware
also petitioned the Court to enter judgment against New York solely on the
Special Master's adoption of the secondary rule. New York renewed its stance
that most of the "creditors" were financial intermediaries themselves with
ascertainable addresses, and that no more than a sampling of these
intermediaries was necessary to determine the predominance of them to be
within its state for purposes of escheat. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
staunchly upheld its prior rulings in Texas v. New Jersey and Pennsylvania v.
New York, and sustained two of Delaware's exceptions in their entirety, one of
Delaware's exceptions in part, and one of New York's exceptions.1
38
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the majority reaffirmed the
primary and secondary rules espoused in Texas v. New Jersey, applying plain
meanings of "debtor" and "creditor" as ascertained from the positive law
creating such relationships. 139  Since the issuing corporations had already
discharged their payment liabilities to financial intermediaries as record
owners," the Court agreed with Delaware that the financial intermediaries left
holding unclaimed corporate distributions, rather than issuing corporations,
were the relevant "debtors" for purposes of escheat priority.' 4 ' Justice Thomas
explained that allowing the state of the issuer's principle place of business to
escheat such unclaimed funds might "permit intangible property rights to be cut
the Special Master solicited further argument on the issue of retroactivity since it was not debated within the
initial party briefs.
137 Report of Special Master, supra note 124, at LEXIS 49. For the practical effects the report would
have on the various states, see Kobrin and Ringel, supra note 80, at 4; Rosenberg and Fisher, supra note 5,
at 20.
138 113 S.Ct. 1550, 1550-62. Justice White, joined by Justices Blaclmun and Stevens, wrote a terse
dissent stating he would uphold the Special Master's Report as most equitable and overrule all exceptions to
it. Id. at 1562 (White, J., dissenting).
139 Idat 1558-59 ("Our rules regarding interstate disputes over competing escheat claims cannot be
severed from the law that creates the underlying creditor-debtor relationships.").
140 See U.C.C. § 8-207, comment 1, 2C U.L.A. 341 (1991), and supra note 122.
141 113 S.Ct. at 1559. Because the Court did not adopt New York's interpretation of the relevant
"debtors" and "creditors," the further proposition that a statistical sampling of intermediary transactions would
be sufficient to presume most last known addresses to be in New York was inapposite. Justice Thomas did
comment, however, that a similar presumption was propounded and rejected in Pennsylvania v. New York.
Id. at 1561.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
off or adversely affected by state action... in a forum having no continuing
relationship to any of the parties to the proceedings.' 42
Furthermore, the majority questioned the Special Master's use of equity to
support his divergence from the existent secondary rule. Since a considerable
number of financial intermediaries are incorporated in Delaware, all parties
recognized that the secondary rule provided Delaware a great windfall.
However, to shift secondary escheat rights to the state of the debtor's, i.e. the
financial intermediary's, principle place of business would simply shift
Delaware's windfall to New York, since most securities intermediaries have
their main offices in that state. Thus, allowing the state of incorporation to
escheat abandoned securities distributions under Texas v. New Jersey dispersed
them no more unequally than under escheat by the state of the issuer's principle
place of business. The Court therefore held, as it did in Pennsylvania v. New
York,"" that there were no compelling reasons to reject the efficiency and ease
of administration inherent in the existent secondary rule of Texas v. New
Jersey.14
4
The majority, however, declined Delaware's invitation to rule against New
York on the face of the Special Master's adoption of the secondary rule.
45
Instead, the case was remanded to the Special Master to determine if any of the
unclaimed distributions seized by New York did in fact have actual last known
addresses in that state."4 Justice Thomas concluded the majority opinion with
a suggestion that any dissatisfied states may air their grievances before
Congress, as was done following Pennsylvania v. New York. 147 The Court
opined that while Congress may be willing to address certain policy
considerations through federal legislation, the Supreme Court would continue
to adhere to the interstate escheat rules established by Texas v. New Jersey, and
now reaffirmed by Delaware v. New York.148
142 Id. at 1559, citing Pennsylvania v. New York, supra note 97, at 213 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14 Id. at 1556.
I" Id. at 1560. Justice Thomas addressed the proposed secondary rle after he had rejected the
Special Master's debtor-creditor analysis. It does seem, however, that had the Supreme Court adopted the
Report's position that the issuing corporation was the appropriate "debtor," the proposed secondary rule would
have distributed the escheated funds more equitably. Id. (the Special Master's plan "cannot survive
independent of his erroneous decision to treat the issuers as the relevant 'debtors."')
145 Id. at 1561.
146 Id.
147 See supra part I(C).
14 113 S.Ct 1550, 1562. Since the Delaware v. New York decision has been handed down, New
York and Delaware have settled the litigation. The settlement called for New York to pay Delaware $200
million to account for the prior unclaimed corporate distributions wrongfully escheated by New York.
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M. Pending Legislation
Encouraged by the Court's invitation in Delaware v. New York, as well as
previous legislative success, 149 those states disgruntled by the majority opinion
have taken their case to Capitol Hill. Bills have been introduced in both houses
of Congress that would sanction as federal law the recommendations made by
the Special Master in his report before the Supreme Court, namely that any
unclaimed securities distributions held by financial intermediaries will escheat
to the state of the issuer's principle place of business when the last known
address of the beneficial owner is unavailable. 50
H.R. 2443 was introduced by Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX)
two-and-a-half months after the Delaware v. New York decision, and is
presently co-sponsored by a majority of the House of Representatives.' 5 ' Rep.
Gonzalez introduced the act as a bipartisan effort to redistribute windfalls
presently enjoyed by both Delaware and New York at the expense of the
remaining states.'52 Legislating the tenets of the Special Master's Report, he
claimed, would uphold the basic value of fairness, and also reward states'
efforts to generate local economic gain by attracting corporate headquarters.' 53
As of May 1994, H.R. 2443 has been referred to the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs," and a hearing has been conducted by
the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Deposit Insurance. 5
S. 1715 was introduced five months later by Senator Kay B. Hutchison (R-
TX), and is presently co-sponsored by an overwhelming majority of the
Senate.'56 In her introductory remarks, Sen. Hutchison said that the goal of S.
Delaware will also be eligible to escheat those future funds presumed abandoned under the secondary rle
of Texas v. New Jersey, as interpreted by Delaware v. New York. Sources indicate that Delaware's right to
escheat under the secondary rule will account for approximately $24 million annually in unclaimed stock
dividends and other profits. Penny Bender, Delaware Duo's Claim to Fame, SUN. NEWS J. (Wilmington,
Del.), February 6, 1994, at A1, A17.
149 See supra part 1(C).
ISO H.R. 2443, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1715, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
151 H.R. 2443 was introduced on June 17, 1993. Three hundred thirty-one representatives are listed
as co-sponsors of record. Available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File.
152 139 CONG. REc. H3776 (daily ed. June 17, 1993)(statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
153 Id. at H3777.
154 139 CONG. REc. H3782 (daily ed. June 17, 1993).
155 140 CONG. REc. D306 (daily ed. March 22, 1994).
156 S. 1715 was introduced on November 19, 1993. The bill is co-sponsored by 78 Senators.
Available in LEXIS, Legis library, Bltrck File.
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1715 was to return unclaimed securities distributions to their states of origin,
and that the Court's decision in Delaware v. New York benefitted only two,
maybe three, states at most. 157 As an original co-sponsor, Senator Paul Simon
(D-IL) also commented on the bill, noting that all fifty states ought to benefit
from abandoned securities funds instead of the present three.158 As of May
1994, the act was referred to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee, 159 and no further action had been taken.' °
The companion bills are virtually identical, and would both add
amendments to Title VI of Public Law 93-495,6 the earlier legislation passed
by Congress to overrule Pennsylvania v. New York. 62 While the primary rule
of Texas v. New Jersey granting escheat rights to the state of the creditor's last
known address is left intact, both acts would create an exception to the
secondary rule for unclaimed securities distributions, deferring escheat rights
to the state of the issuer's principle executive offices rather than the domicile
state of the financial intermediary left holding the property. 63 As suggested by
the Special Master in Delaware v. New York," corporate headquarters would
be those designated by the corporation itself in its governmental filings, usually
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.'65
Should the state of the issuer's principle place of business be unable to
escheat the unclaimed distributions, the legislation also provides for a tertiary
rule for escheat hierarchy by allowing the state of the holder's principle place
of business to assume the unclaimed funds." This situation would occur when
the financial intermediary holding the unclaimed distribution does not have the
157 139 CONG. REC. S16463-64 (daily ed. November 19, 1993). The third state mentioned is
Massachusetts, since it is the state of incorporation of several large banks and depositories.
152 139 CONG. REC. S16847 (daily ed. November 20, 1993).
159 139 CONG. REc. S16432 (daily ed. November 19, 1993).
160 Supra note 156.
161 88 Stat. 1525 (October 28, 1974), codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2501 to 2503 (West 1989 & Supp.
1994).
162 Since each bill is in the form of an amendment, footnote references to particular portions of these
bills will be made by first listing the section of the actual legislation itself, and then indexing within quotation
marks the section of Public Law 93-495 to be amended.
163 H.R. 2443, supra note 151, § 2(a), "§ 613(a)"; S. 1715, id., § 2, "§ 613(a)". Similar to the
Supreme Court precedents, however, this legislated escheat right would be subject at any time to another
state's superior escheat right that may later be brought.
16 Report of Special Master, supra note 134.
165 H.R. 2443, supra note 151, § 2(a), "§ 612(1)"; S. 1715, id., § 2, "§ 612(5)". In the event a
corporation has its principle executive offices in more than one state, each state so indicated shall escheat on
a "pro-rata basis." H.R. 2443, supra note 151, § 2(a), "§ 613(e)"; S. 1715, id., § 2, "§ 613(d)".
166 H.R. 2443, supra note 151, § 2(a), "§ 613(b)"; S. 1715, id., § 2, "§ 613(b)".
ESCHEAT? GESUNDHEIT
last known address of the corporate issuer,'67 or when the state containing the
issuer's principle executive offices is unable to accept the property under its
present escheat laws.6" This tertiary rule, like the proposed new secondary
rule, would also yield to any greater escheat right brought forward by another
state.
Despite a majority of Congressional delegates having declared their co-
sponsorship of these pending acts,169 both H.R. 2443 and S. 1715 may die in
committee if prompt action is not taken before the end of this legislative
session. Several reasons may exist for the present inaction. First, the emphasis
on and push for both a crime bill and President Clinton's health-care legislation
may be monopolizing all Congressional functions to the fullest extent possible.
Second, despite general support in both Houses, 17 there may be dissension as
to specific portions of each bill.'7' Third, Congress may be content to stay its
regular bureaucratic course via circuitous committee action, as opposed to a
quick and impulsive vote, before the session's end. But perhaps the most
plausible basis for Congressional inactivity may be that individual legislators
are understandably confused about the frequently intricate webs that permeate
escheat processes, and simply need more time to acquaint themselves with the
requisite information in order to make an intelligent decision.
It may very well be that there is no quick and easy answer to the escheat
dilemma. Though Texas v. New Jersey supposedly ended. the confusion
surrounding state escheat, the Supreme Court continues to hear cases defining
interstate hierarchies. Even now the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws is in the process of drafting yet a fourth measure
concerning the disposition of abandoned or unclaimed intangible property. So
long as the possibility of lining state coffers with tax-free capital coexists with
167 As long as the holder uses "reasonable efforts" to locate the last known address of a corporate
issuer and is unsuccessful, those attempts by the financial intermediary are considered presumptive of the
absence of an issuer's last known address. H.R. 2443, supra note 151, § 2(a), "§ 613(d)"; S. 1715, id., § 2,
"§ 613(c)". A state, however, may challenge this presumption at its own expense. Id.
168 See supra note 90.
169 Supra notes 152 and 157.
170 It is worth noting that the legislation is staunchly opposed by Delaware, New York and
Massachusetts. Through their legislators, these states presently enjoy vast influence in Congressional circles,
which may alone account for any hesitation to pass the measures. Penny Bender, Lawmakers Ward Offa
Reversal of Fortune, SUN. NEws J. (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 6, 1994, at A16.
17 A likely point of contention may prove to be the issue of retroactivity. To legislate a full-scale
reversal of the past escheats of all fifty states would create an administrative catastrophe that might ultimately
cost more that the potential value of that unclaimed property sought. Moreover, while a majority of states
would likely gain a new source of revenue under the new law, presumably each state would also have to
surrender at least a portion of its past escheats in exchange.
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a multitude of escheat ideologies, it seems that controversies involving state
escheat will remain a source of interstate contention. And unless a fitting
solution is promptly confirmed by either the Supreme Court or Congress, or
both, the escheat dilemma may be the only discernable partner we can count on
as we enter the twenty-first century.
